I simulate a life-cycle model with preferences described by a utility function à la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) . I show that temptation to consume contributes to explain the saving, retirement consumption, and asset allocation puzzles. I perform two analyses, with and without Social Security protection, separately for the US and Italy. The pension replacement rate is endogenous in the model and varies with income realizations. The results also show that the optimal behavior differs remarkably between the two countries when Social Security is considered. In particular, the more generous Italian system depresses savings and investments of more tempted individuals.
Introduction
This paper investigates the role of temptation as a possible explanation for sub-optimal consumption and investment choices. It is a well-known economic puzzle that individuals save less than they should do according to standard life-cycle models (Hall and Mishkin, 1982) , and that their consumption drops at retirement (Banks et al., 1998) . This evidence is consistent with rule-of-thumb theories of wealth accumulation, in which agents choose to consume just their income, instead of smoothing their consumption over the life-cycle. A way to model this behavior in a life-cycle model is to consider a "quasihyperbolic discounting" (Laibson, 1997) instead of a standard exponential one. This discount factor produces a behavior compatible with the empirical evidence (Angeletos et al., 2001 ), but gives rise to time inconsistent preferences. An agent may value actions differently ex post than at the time they are taken, and so may later regret those actions. This issue makes the resulting behavior hard to interpret.
With a utility function based on Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) "temptation and self-control preferences" it is possible to obtain the same results using standard dynamic programming techniques. Suboptimal behavior is explained by temptation rather than myopia. Temptation causes agents to repeatedly delay savings and investments that they know to be necessary. This paper contributes to the literature inserting a utility function à la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) in a life-cycle model and analyzing the consumption, saving and investment behavior of representative agents. The literature on this field usually assumes that individuals just follow either a forward-looking or a rule-of-thumb behavior. Empirical evidence, nevertheless, suggests that they are not extreme, but prudent and impatient, forward-looking and rule-of-thumb at the same time. I therefore study the optimal behavior considering different degrees of temptation. With this model I also analyze whether temptation can explain the asset allocation puzzle. There is evidence of a participation rate in the equity market smaller than predicted by standard models (around 50 percent in the US, see for instance Gomes and Michaelides, 2005) . Since temptation postpones personal saving and the accumulation of wealth, it should be responsible for lower participation rates at early ages.
Temptation also provides a justification for government intervention. Workers with higher levels of temptation have less resources available for consumption after retirement. Social Security, guaranteeing a stable income during the lifespan, protects their wellbeing at later ages.
I develop my analysis separately in a laissez-faire economy, where no Social Security program is implemented, and in a paternalistic economy, in which the current system is considered. While the case of a paternalistic economy is more realistic and appropriate to study puzzles such as the retirement consumption drop, I expect the laissez-faire case to produce the pure, unaffected result of temptation in in-dividual behavior. Social Security programs may indeed influence individual decisions, and may do so differently for diverse degrees of temptation. For this reason in the paper I provide an estimate of the substitution effect between Social Security payroll tax and personal saving.
My model includes uninsurable labor income risk, and uncertainty on market returns and lifespan. I also consider the political risk that government does not respect its promises and reduces retirement benefits to keep Social Security balance sound. Under the paternalistic economy, contrary to most existing literature, I do not assume the replacement rate to be fixed and exogenously given. In the model Social Security accumulation enters the optimization problem as a state variable. Different realizations of the labor income process can then modify an individual's projections about her future replacement rate, and eventually produce a variable replacement rate.
The model, that does not admit a closed-form solution, is simulated with respect to two countries:
the United States and Italy. The two countries differ in the generosity of their Social Security programs and in the formulas used in the calculation of their benefits. The payroll tax collected by the government and devoted to Social Security only is 10.6 percent in the US, and 32.7 percent (employed) or 16.8% (self-employed) in Italy. The benefits depend on past income realizations, and are expected to be roughly equal to 40 percent in the US, and 60 percent in Italy. The Italian system collects thus a higher tax and promises a larger benefit. The main difference between the two systems is however in their nature. Both Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO), and therefore sensitive to demographic trends such as the decline in birth rates and rises in life expectancy, the American program is essentially of a Defined Benefit (DB) type, while the Italian one follows a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) scheme after the 1995 Dini reform 1 . In a DB scheme the worker pays a tax and is guaranteed a subsidy after retirement.
In the US, in particular, a progressive formula is used to compute higher replacement rates for those with lower earnings. A NDC scheme is non-redistributional instead -although redistribution may be accommodated within the scheme -but more transparent compared with a DB scheme. It guarantees a closer link between contributions and benefits. Each individual has a personal account to which she pays a prescribed annual amount of share of earnings; after retirement the benefit is computed as an actuarially fair fraction of the wealth accumulated in the personal account. I include these characteristics in the model and investigate how they affect individual behavior. My thesis is that Social Security is not neutral on saving and investment decisions. In particular I expect that the higher protection of the more generous Italian system causes individuals with more temptation to save sensibly less than the American counterparts would do.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main characteristics of the model, while Section 3 presents the calibration results. In Section 4 I discuss the results for the baseline case in a laissez-faire and in a paternalistic economy; in Section 5 I report results on the sensitivity analysis.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes the results and concludes. The appendix provides some mathematical details.
The model
To simplify the problem I consider a life-cycle model in which individuals, rather than households, are the decision makers. A model based on households as the economic unit would need to adjust for the household size, age of the household members and possibly their inter-relationships. The requirement of this information would bring additional noise to the model. Deaton and Paxson (2000) finds indeed empirical support for the life-cycle model at the individual level much more than at the household level.
In the model time is discrete and t denotes adult age (effective age minus 19). Each period corresponds to one year, and an agent lives for a maximum of 81 T = periods (age 100), 46 R = (age 65) as a worker and 35 T R − = as a retiree. For simplicity, the retirement age is taken as exogenous. I define t π as the probability that a person is alive at time t conditional on being alive at time 1 t − .
I consider Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) "temptation and self-control preferences" and define a period utility function similarly to Hurst and Willen (2004) :
(1) 
Labor income process
Following Zeldes (1989) , the labor income process before retirement t L is exogenously described Earnings in retirement depend on Social Security benefits and are computed endogenously. I model the Social Security system in the following way. During working life the individual saves a fraction α of current labor income as retirement wealth. During working life retirement wealth is illiquid; the individual cannot consume it or borrow against it. At age 1 t R = + DB wealth is rolled into a risk-less annuity A , according to the formulas described in §A.2 (equations 27 and 28). This assumption of riskless annuitization affects the retiree's portfolio composition. Disposable income is thus given by
Financial assets
An individual can invest in two financial assets, one risk-less (T-bills or cash) with gross real return f R , and one risky (equities), with excess return The correlation between equity shock and transitory income shock is instead assumed to be null.
According to this formulation, the one-period correlation between equity market returns and labor income growth is approximately given by 1 LE nε ρ ρ < :
and the correlation from the beginning to the end of the working life is (see §A.4):
To explain limited market participation, I consider a fixed period participation cost F to have access to the equity market, rather than a one-period trading cost. Both costs appear to be relevant in explaining market non-participation (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) , and are consistent with the fact that the participation rate is strongly increasing in financial wealth. Although the existence of both costs is easily recognized, the lifetime-horizon nature of one-period trading costs prevents one from obtaining accurate estimates. I therefore choose period participation costs in order to calibrate the model with a more reliable estimate.
A period participation cost represents brokerage account fees and the opportunity cost of time spent throughout the year to acquire information. A period participation cost can explain why some do not participate when they have low financial wealth; in the model this is more likely for those with a positive temptation τ . The cost deters young individuals from buying equities, but later in the life-cycle these individuals might find it worthwhile to begin participating if their wealth levels are high enough to justify paying the cost. Further, period participation costs rationalize the evidence that many households exit from the market, i.e., they do not participate even though they made some investment in the past years (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002) .
Political risk
The government needs to revisit benefits or taxes from time to time, when there are changes in the demographic and macroeconomic variables that support PAYGO programs. Social Security is thus subject to a political risk (Diamond, 1996) . In particular I assume that the government is passive in changing the parameters of the Social Security program; it does not make any intervention and, as a result, it might not be able to pay the promised benefit at retirement. The risk is modeled with a Bernoulli random variable φ associated to the annuity benefit:
The benefit is thus reduced of a fraction ω with probability q . The average [ ] E q φ ω = may be interpreted from an individual's perspective as the subjective probability of being "cheated" by the government, that pays a benefit lower than the one promised.
The optimization problem
Let β denote the discount rate, and
an exogenous individual demographic factor as in Attanasio et al. (1999 Given the paucity of literature for Italy, I obtain ex novo estimates of most of the exogenous parameters for such country. I do the same for the US to keep the comparison as much reliable as possible.
Labor income process
The deterministic profile of the labor income process, t G , reflects the hump shape of earnings over the life cycle, and is considered separately for four different groups: employed individuals with at most high school education (baseline case) or college education, and self-employed individuals with at most high school education or college education (figure 1). 
Figure 1. Age-Labor income profile

US Italy
This sample split is intended to accommodate the well-established finding that age profiles differ in shape across education and occupation groups. The profiles are derived from a fixed effect pseudopanel regression 3 of log-income over age, age squared, family size and marital status; the dependent variable is corrected for inflation and productivity growth as in Diamond et al. (1976) . The panel data sets used are those in the PSID (US) and SHIW (Italy) surveys; the sample covers the period 1989 :2002 (1990 1989 -2002 . I consider only workers in age between 20 and 64.
Earnings for the group with more education are higher on average, rise and fall more steeply, and peak at later age than for the group with less education. On average, the deterministic income grows at a rate of 2.03% in the US, close to Carroll and Samwick (1997) , and 1.44% in Italy; the last income ( t R = ) is predicted to be about three times higher than the first income ( 1 t = ) in the US, as in Diamond et al. (1976) , and about 2.5 times higher in Italy.
The procedure adopted for estimating the standard deviation of permanent and transitory shocks closely follows that in Carroll and Samwick (1997) and is described in §A.5; estimates used in the simulation are reported in table 1. In one case (Italian self-employed with at most high school education) the OLS procedure estimates a negative permanent shock variance; as in Campbell et al. (2001) I set it to zero and attribute all the variance to the transitory shock. The magnitude of the estimates is in line with the literature, where the standard deviation of the permanent shock ranges between 0.10 and 0.32, and the standard deviation of the transitory shock ranges between 0.15 and 0.32. In particular, the baseline estimates are close to those in Carroll and Samwick (1997) and in Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , who report 0.15 for the permanent shock and 0.21 for the transitory shock. From the above table one can draw the following comments. First, both shocks are more volatile for a self-employed, consistently with Campbell et al. (2001) . Second, a college graduate faces more risk than a non-college graduate with similar occupation. This is consistent with the idea that the higher returns emanating from increased education come at the cost of higher earnings risk. Third, the variance associated with a permanent income shock is much smaller than the variance of a transitory income shock.
Financial markets
Following the standard calibration in the literature, the constant net real interest rate 1 f R − is set at 2%; for the equity return process I consider a mean equity premium μ of 4.39% (US) and 3.73% (Italy), and a standard deviation ε σ of 16.96% (US) and 20.15% (Italy). The estimates highlight, as expected, a better performance of the US market, and are consistent with the existing literature on US market returns (e.g. Campbell et al, 2001; Cocco et al., 2005) . I obtain these numbers from inflationcorrected S&P500 and MSCI Europe annual return time series, covering monthly the sample period January 1973 -December 2002 (360 observations). I make use of the European equity market for Italy since, after the launch of a single currency in Europe, investment home bias turns out to be much smaller (Danthine et al., 2000) .
Notwithstanding asset returns have received substantial attention from financial researchers, only a handful of scholars has investigated their correlation in the US with labor income, often coming to opposite conclusions. Some authors find that labor income covaries with stock returns positively (e.g. Campbell et al., 2001) or negatively (Heaton and Lucas, 2000) . For some others the correlation between the two processes is not significant (Fama and Schwert, 1977) . I follow the algorithm developed in Campbell et al. (2001) (details in §A.5), and obtain the estimates shown in table 2.
The data provide evidence of an insignificant correlation in the US, as in Davis and Willen (2000) and Cocco et al. (2005) , and a significantly large correlation for Italy. The result for Italy is confirmed by the application of the same algorithm on MSCI Italy returns rather than MSCI Europe data. Using formulas (7) and (8) in the baseline case (employed with at most high school education), the correlation between income growth and market returns is equal to zero for the US and 0.15 (in one period) and 0.3363 (over all the working life) in Italy. According to Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) , a positive corre-lation between labor income and stock returns exacerbates consumption risk. The result thus provides a rationale for a low level of investment in equities, as typically observed in Italy (Guiso et al., 2002) . Existing literature states that fixed market participation costs are significant but small in magnitude.
I therefore set a conservative estimate of F = $100 in the US, according to Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Attanasio and Paiella (2006) , and F = €150 in Italy, following Paiella and Tiseno (2005) . The difference between the two countries finds support in Guiso et al. (2003) . Their analysis shows that country differences in actual and perceived transaction costs play an important role in reconciling international differences in stockholding participation. Such costs appear to be larger in Italy than in the US. 
Political risk
Preference parameters
To estimate the parameters β (discount factor) and γ (relative risk aversion) I adopt the four-step procedure described in §A.6. Table 3 shows the output results assuming different levels of temptation.
Let us first focus on the case 0 τ = . The output shows that in the US, where a higher equity premium is expected from the financial market (see indeed §3.2), individuals are more risk averse, with a parameter of about 3 against 1.5. Both estimates are compatible with Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) , that suggests a coefficient in the neighborhood of 2 to be a reasonable base case. Note, however, how large the standard error for this measure is. According to the estimates, an American individual also exhibits a smaller discount factor. Allowing the temptation parameter to change, while keeping the same dataset, risk aversion remains consistently larger, and the discount factor smaller, in the US than in Italy. The estimates reveal that, as τ increases, both β and γ grow. The variation is statistically significant as shown by a Newey-West test of parametric restrictions, in which the null hypothesis is that the parameters β and γ are equal to the values when 0 τ = . The behavior observed in the data can be explained as a combination of either small risk aversion and discount factor with low temptation, or larger parameters with more temptation.
In other words, an increase in temptation is coherent with these data only if the discount factor and risk aversion coefficients are larger, although the discount factor gets a value unreasonably above one for and INPS, the Italian National Social Security Institute. The variation across time of the factor mainly depends on the demographic effect, which decreases steadily over time; the factor declines more steeply after age 80, when the survival probability falls. The parameter is larger in Italy at earlier ages (the demographic effect is more important than in the US) and smaller at later ages (the survival probability is lower than in the US). This subjective discount rate is on average equal to 0.95 in the US and 0.96 in Italy; it is larger than a standard discount factor of 0.96 at ages younger than 39 in the US and 54 in Italy. 
Figure 2. Discount factor profile
Simulation results
In this section I report results based on 1,000 simulations over random realizations of labor income, equity market, and political risk. I first consider a model in which no Social Security system is present (laissez-faire economy), and then a model under the current Social Security system (paternalistic economy). over all the lifespan, only the working or the retirement period. All the variables are standardized dividing by disposable permanent income ( )
Laissez-faire economy
It is clear from the table that the optimal average behavior is similar in both countries, when Social Security programs are absent. During the working life, consumption is larger (and consequently saving smaller) and investment smaller as τ increases; during retirement, consumption is smaller as τ increases. Since a person with more temptation makes less saving while working, a smaller stock of 4 The average values are taken using an actualizing factor based on the risk free rate of return wealth is available to be converted in consumption. Note that, over the retirement life, saving is negative and corresponds, with an opposite sign, to consumption. This is a consequence of having no Social Security protection. Also investment is smaller as τ increases, although in this case the change does not seem to be significant. On average over all the lifespan, an individual with higher τ consumes and invests less. Over lifetime, saving is on average negative because the investment in the financial market generates additional wealth that is ultimately spent in the absence of bequest motives. with no Social Security she makes no consumption during retirement, and her lifetime equivalent consumption is inevitably null.
From the table we also conclude that in most cases the average equity investment is significantly larger over retirement. This result, in sharp contrast with the typical advice from financial planners, who recommend to shift investments away from stocks and toward bonds when aging, is coherent with empirical (Poterba and Samwick, 2001 ) and theoretical (Viceira, 2001) findings. The key explanation relies on the uninsurable riskiness of labor income. Bodie et al. (1992) show that, when future labor income is certain, it is optimal for employed investors to hold proportionately more equities in their portfolios than it is for retired investors. But risky labor income increases the willingness to save and reduces the equity portfolio allocation during the working life (Viceira, 2001) . 
US Italy
The profile is essentially the same in both countries. A less disciplined individual starts saving later, but approaching retirement her savings are larger (although close for 1 3 τ = , 1, 3 ). In such period the doer succumbs to the planner, and temptation exerts a weaker influence than the concern of having no consumption in the future; this delayed discipline results in a consumption drop close to retirement. After retirement consumption decreases steadily, especially in Italy, as a result of a larger probability of dying. is equal to cash-on-hand up to a fixed point (hereafter I call it the "threshold point"), approximately corresponding to permanent income, constantly decreasing over time. Consuming less than cash-onhand at any level below the threshold is considered unacceptable, and therefore no saving is made. For any cash-on-hand above the threshold point, the slope of the consumption function is much smaller, and the individual makes a progressively larger saving. As the agent gets older, a smaller cash-on-hand is considered a reasonable threshold, and the individual starts saving sensibly more for her retirement.
The threshold point over retirement is equal to zero. In other words, the individual always saves part of her cash-on-hand, because there is no guaranteed subsidy from the government. This saving gets smaller approaching the terminal age T , and is ultimately null (note the 45-degree line) because of the assumption of no bequest motives. 
In the first few years the market participation cost is binding and prevents potential investors from entering the market. The cost is relatively less important as time goes by, when more wealth is accumulated and labor income typically increases. After a few years, indeed, the individual starts investing. At the beginning, there are essentially no financial wealth and a large amount of human capital. Given this disequilibrium, she is willing to make a progressively larger investment in equities as time goes by, when the relative weight of human capital declines, and financial wealth grows. When approaching retirement, there is more financial wealth than human capital, and the individual optimally starts allocating a smaller fraction of financial wealth to equities. This happens less remarkably as temptation is higher, and the point in which financial wealth is larger than human capital comes later and more marginally 6 . Over retirement, there is no more human capital, and the individual's portfolio includes just financial wealth. In this case the optimal decision is to invest everything in equities, as the correlation with income is no longer a restraint. The investment gets progressively smaller after 75 when the survival probability reduces sizeably, the individual starts dissaving and prefers to avoid unnecessary risk.
The behavior is different between the US and Italy, as a consequence of a different market performance (better for the US) and a different correlation with labor income (null for the US and positive for Italy). More tempted individuals start investing later, but after retirement the behavior is essentially the same disregarding temptation. This result highlights that the investment decision is mainly driven by the saving behavior over the working life. More tempted individuals tend to postpone savings, accumulate wealth more slowly and therefore make no investment at early ages since they have no wealth to invest.
I also consider the optimal behavior of agents other than the baseline case, employed and with high school education at most. In particular I refer to other three groups: employed with college degree, selfemployed with high school education at most, and self-employed with college education. These groups differ in the parameters associated with their income process. The results (not reported, but available upon request) do not manifest any significant difference with what described above. It only appears that, in both countries, a self-employed or an agent with a college degree tends to save and invest more.
The relation between consumption, investment and temptation is still preserved.
Optimal payroll taxation
It is finally interesting to determine the optimal Social Security payroll taxation, and to study how it changes in the four groups. Let us focus on rule-of-thumb agents (τ → ∞ ) and disregard for a moment their consumption after retirement. I compute the optimal, mandatory and fixed level of savings as the C on the average sample realizations of t L , where the weights are given by the product between survival probabilities and a discount factor based on the risk free rate of return. According to the table, the optimal payroll tax is equal to about = α 8% in both countries, and its confidence interval ranges between 4 and 12 percent.
Disregarding consumption after retirement, we are implicitly assuming that both individuals, disciplined and undisciplined, act similarly at the end of their working life. This is clearly false: suppose that the government forces both to pay a contribution of 8% of labor income, returned as a lump-sum at retirement. A disciplined agent will save and invest this wealth, smoothing her consumption over the remaining part of life. An undisciplined individual will rather choose to immediately consume the wealth, and will have no more resources to spend afterwards.
It is thus reasonable that the optimal taxation is measured over both the working and the retirement life. I therefore assume that the government receives a tax α , accumulates it in a fund with growth rate f R , and returns after R an annuity computed as
The optimal tax solves
= … is the consumption profile of the undisciplined agent when the tax is α . The inclusion in the analysis of the retirement period brings additional variation that the undisciplined agent will probably prefer to reduce with a larger payroll tax. The last two columns of table 5 report the estimates using consumption and income realizations from the simulation. The optimal tax is also computed as the result of a WLS estimate of the equation
where t D is a dummy variable that takes the value one when t R ≤ . The estimates keep similar between the two countries and are higher than before, ranging between 12 and 13 percent. With a payroll tax of 12-13 percent an undisciplined agent would thus reach the consumption profile closest to the one of a disciplined agent. The estimate is close to the actual 10.6% payroll tax under the current US Social Security program, but very far from the 32.7% tax for Italian employed workers. This result is thus supportive for the adequateness of the current payroll tax in the US; the conclusion is not new and finds support in, for instance, Hurst and Willen (2004) . The tax required by the Italian government seems instead to be too severe, and it might potentially have a negative impact on personal saving and investment. When τ is not infinite, a closed-form solution is not available, since consumption is smaller than disposable income or annuity benefit. It is still possible, however, to find α numerically, comparing 0 , 1, ,
Table 5. Optimal payroll taxation
The table describes the optimal payroll taxation for American and Italian individuals differing in occupation (employed or self-employed) and education (high school degree at most or college degree). I define optimal taxation the fixed parameter that minimizes the square distance between the optimal consumption of disciplined (zero temptation) and undisciplined (infinite temptation) individuals. Optimal consumption for undisciplined agents corresponds to their disposable labor income or Social Security benefits. The tax is computed over the working life, according to equation (12), or over the lifetime, according to equation (14). I use for disposable income and optimal consumption average values based on 1,000 simulations of the model with no Social Security protection. The optimal taxation is computed separately for several groups differing in education and occupation. Standard errors in parentheses;
, consumption profiles obtained from the simulation for different levels of temptation and assuming specific parameters α . It turns out that the optimal taxation is always equal to zero. The behavior of tempted individuals is thus biased by the application of any mandatory taxation; any tax would increase rather than decrease the difference with the consumption profile of the disciplined agent. This is explained by the fact that i) α is fixed, but tempted individuals would prefer to have it increasing with age, and compensate for it consuming more when approaching retirement, and ii) Social Security invests in bonds, whereas such individuals would recur at least partly to the equity market, thus obtaining a larger annuity benefit. Figure 6 compares the optimal consumption profiles for a disciplined agent with and without a Social Security program.
Current Social Security program
Figure 6. Average Age-Consumption profile
The figure describes the average age-consumption profile of American (top panel) and Italian (bottom panel) baseline (employed and with high school education at most) disciplined (temptation = 0) individuals. The average is based on 1,000 simulations of the model with and without Social Security protection.
US Italy
Social Security effectively prevents an individual from having a too small consumption in the final years, when an excessively low survival probability discourages from keeping personal wealth. The magnitude of this protection is however different between the two countries. According to the simulation, a baseline individual expects to receive an average replacement rate of 32.52% in the US and 62.05% in Italy. The generosity of the Italian system makes the lifetime consumption profile much flatter than it would be in a laissez-faire economy. Thus the Italian government seems to produce a larger influence with its pension system. Table 6 summarizes statistics relative to a simulation under the current Social Security program.
Also here, an individual with less discipline consumes more, saves and invests less; the magnitude of consumption drop for individuals with some temptation is similar to that observed in the reality 7 . There are, nevertheless, several differences with the behavior in a laissez-faire economy. First of all, the larger generosity of the Italian pension system makes a person better off in the present situation, with the possibility to consume a larger portion of wealth, especially over retirement. Because of Social Security protection, individuals save less -on average over the working life, an agent with full selfcontrol saves now 2% instead of 7% of her disposable income. Also, the investment is generally lower, especially after retirement. Finally, an individual with positive temptation 0 τ > makes almost no saving; an Italian one does not even invest. agents. Compared with the laissez-faire case in figure 4 , the threshold point is now significantly above zero after retirement, and is approximately equal to the pension replacement rate, thus higher in Italy.
Table 6. Average consumption, investment, and saving
The table describes the average consumption, investment and saving of American and Italian baseline (employed and with high school education at most) individuals with different degrees of temptation. The average is based on 1,000 simulations of the model with Social Security protection and is taken using the risk free rate of return as actualizing
During the working life it is slightly smaller in Italy, where the NDC formula, more connected with labor income risk, produces an incentive for accumulating each year some precautionary saving. An Italian exhibits immediately after R a consumption function already close to the 45-degree line.
Italians feel more protected by Social Security and, therefore, start immediately consume more than just their pension. This result matches with the evidence in table 6 that an Italian with less discipline hardly saves and invests. Figure 9 compares the optimal investment profile for a disciplined individual with and without Social Security programs. The profile is quite different, also within the two countries. Essentially, investment in the US is lower over the working life and higher over retirement; in Italy the contrary seems instead true. In any case, equity holding is still higher after retirement, consistently with empirical findings (Guiso et al., 2002) .
To understand this behavior, consider that an individual's portfolio includes an additional asset when Social Security is present. Aside from financial and human wealth, one has to take into account retirement wealth. This takes the form of the expected present value of future annuities and is uncertain, with its uncertainty related to lifetime income realizations and political risk. The uncertainty reduces progressively as time goes by, when more information on labor income is available. After retirement, when also the political risk is vanished, the fund is completely risk-less. The size of this fund decreases only after retirement, when benefits are finally received. The addition of this fund depresses investment at early ages in Italy (where a high, positive correlation is observed) and tends to promote them later, as the fund becomes closer to a risk-less asset. The generosity of the Italian system, however, causes the weight of this fund to be large, which provides an incentive to invest generally more in equities. In the US, on the contrary, the fund does depress investment more persistently because of more uncertainty on future pensions, arising from a different (redistributive) benefit formula and a larger political risk. After retirement a risk-less fund should promote risky investments, but the already mentioned generosity of the Italian system discourages from saving. The analysis on different groups still confirms that individuals with more education or working as self-employed save and invest more than the baseline case. In general, this behavior is due to precau-tionary reasons, because i) labor income is more uncertain and ii) Social Security is less generous for these categories.
Substitution effect between personal saving and payroll tax
I finally report an estimate of the substitution effect between payroll tax and personal saving. Social Security is expected to have an impact on personal saving through its contributions and benefits, but the size and the direction of this impact is controversial. Although in some, isolated cases it is found that Social Security arrangements boost saving (e.g. Koskela and Viren, 1983) , most of the literature supports the view that Social Security is not a perfect substitute for private saving, since i) future Social Security benefits are not liquid until retirement, ii) the implicit rate of return on pensions is different from that on financial saving, and iii) there is a political risk that might affect future benefits. In particular, a substitution effect around 20-35 percent in the US (see Feldstein and Pellecchio, 1979, and King and Dicks-Mireaux, 1982 ) and 10-20 percent in Italy (Brugiavini, 1987, and Rossi and Visco, 1994 ) is estimated.
I estimate the effect by comparing the two average personal saving profiles in a laissez-faire economy with those in a paternalistic economy under the current Social Security program. The effect is estimated running a simple OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the optimal average lifecycle saving profile over the working life, and the explanatory variables are a polynomial on age (to capture age effects, see Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003) β describes the change in saving when the payroll tax increases by one unit, and thus estimates the substitution effect. My expectation is that the introduction of a Social Security program determines a significant reduction in personal savings, possibly small, and that this reduction is less relevant in those with some temptation. to 0.38 percent of permanent income for a disciplined American individual, and 0.15 percent for a disciplined Italian individual. As expected, the effect is smaller, i.e., the agent is less affected on her decision, as temptation τ gets larger. A rule-of-thumb (τ → ∞ ) individual, who makes no saving in any case, is totally indifferent about Social Security taxation and has therefore a substitution effect equal to zero. According to the table, the substitution effect is smaller also when the agent is more educated, or works as a self-employed. Two differences between the two countries are, however, remarkable. First, the substitution effect is always smaller in Italy. Second, the substitution effect in Italy is less influenced by temptation, and there seems to be no influence at all from education or the occupation. When 1 τ ≥ in the US it is not even possible to reject the null of zero substitution effect. 
Sensitivity analysis
In this section I report simulation results for the baseline individual allowing several parameters to change from the benchmark case. I also studied the consequence of various degrees of political risk, but it seems that higher political risk promotes just slightly precautionary saving and lets investment essentially unchanged.
Savings and investment
The absence of market participation costs favors a complete investment in equities (even in Italy, where the life-cycle average investment would be an unrealistic 98.30% instead of 36.90% with the calibrated participation cost), whereas a cost ( 300 F = ) larger than the benchmark one ( 150 F = in Italy) would be responsible for a counter-factual absence of investments until age 53 (see Figure 10 for Italy). To compensate, when the entry in the equity market is optimal, the agent chooses to invest all her wealth in equities. Similar conclusions arise for the US. Consumption and equity investment decline monotonically when background income risk increases; agents become more prudent, increase savings and make more conservative investment decisions to prepare against a possible decline in income. An increase in transitory shock, however, produces a smaller effect than an increase in permanent shock, and in particular its effect on personal saving is negligible. Figure 11 ). With no risk in the labor market, an agent invests almost always all her wealth in equities. Introducing a transitory risk, the optimal investment is less than complete over all the working life. On the contrary, a permanent risk reduces the optimal investment more heavily, starting earlier, and promotes the accumulation of precautionary saving. Individuals show to be much more concerned about permanent than transitory shocks, since a permanent shock has repercussions over all the lifetime income realizations, whereas the effect of a transitory shock disappears after one period. The joint effect of both shocks further reduces personal investments. A comparison between the baseline case and the one with just permanent shock risk highlights that it is the permanent component to mainly drive the optimal decision: investment is higher on average when this risk An individual responds to a better performance in the equity market increasing the equity holding and reducing saving (now less necessary for the higher expected market return).
In the model I make the assumption of zero correlation between market returns and transitory income shocks. When the parameter varies, there do not appear to be a qualitatively significant difference with the benchmark model. The behavior seems to be more affected by the correlation between market returns and permanent income shocks; in particular when there is no correlation -the benchmark case in the US -a difference is clearly visible. In this case, investors allocate a higher fraction of their wealth to equities.
A reduction in risk aversion makes an investor less sensitive to uncertainty, and increases the optimal share invested in equities, but also decreases wealth accumulation at every stage of the life-cycle. Figure 12 shows how the consumption profile changes with risk aversion in the US. Individuals with a low risk aversion save less, especially over their 30s and 40s, and consume more when approaching retirement. As a consequence, their consumption drops after the working life because less wealth has been accumulated. The discount factor has a similar effect. Figure 13 reports the life-cycle consumption profile of an
Italian when the parameter β changes; a more prudent (i.e., with higher β ) person exhibits a smoother profile and tends to consume constantly less during the working life, especially at early ages. A higher β , however, does not imply more concern about risk, and does not reduce investments. On the contrary, investments are boosted by the availability of more financial wealth. 
NO!
Optimal payroll tax and substitution effect
In most cases the optimal payroll tax for undisciplined agents is still roughly equal to 13% in both countries when some parameters change from the benchmark case. The optimal payroll tax seems to be particularly sensitive to the risk aversion and the income risk shocks. When 5 γ = or 0.2 n u σ σ = = the optimal tax grows to about 18% both in the US and Italy. In such cases, the current US payroll tax (10.6%) happens to be smaller than optimal.
Also the substitution effect between payroll tax and personal saving is consistent with the benchmark estimates 38% (US) and 15% (Italy) when several parameters change. It is even unaffected by parameters such as the correlation between equities and labor income, the market participation cost, or the political risk. It is more sensitive, instead, to risk aversion. In particular, it shows to range between 15%
( 1 γ = ) and 47% ( 5 γ = ) in the US, and between 6% and 23% in Italy under the same levels of γ . In any case, it is significantly smaller in Italy.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I develop a life-cycle model to investigate the effect of temptation on individual consumption and investment choice. Temptation provides a rationale for apparently sub-optimal phenomena such as under-saving and under-investment. I simulate the model for two countries, the US and Italy, in the absence and in the presence of their current Social Security program. The model accounts for the main differences in the two retirement systems and, contrary to most of the literature, includes Social Security wealth as a state variable in the problem. This way an optimizing agent is allowed to project and revise annually her expectation about Social Security benefits. Furthermore, uncertainty on labor income and political risk may produce a replacement rate different from the promised average. The results show to be robust to changes in the exogenous parameters.
The simulation shows that an individual with more temptation always saves and invest in equities less than an individual with less temptation. In particular, the decision to save and invest is delayed over time. As a consequence, the consumption profile gets less smooth and, during retirement, a drop is observable. Absent Social Security, the average behavior is similar between the two countries, and I estimate an optimal payroll taxation for an undisciplined agent to be around 13 percent. This number is very close to the actual 10.6% in the US, but far from the 32.7% in Italy.
Including Social Security, the effect is still the same, but savings and investments are now reduced.
Social Security guarantees more protection and provides therefore a strong incentive to cut savings and investments. This incentive affects primarily individuals with more temptation. Especially in Italy, agents with more temptation almost quit their savings.
I estimate a substitution effect between payroll tax and personal saving of about 38% for a baseline US individual with no temptation, and 15% for a corresponding Italian one. The effect decreases with more temptation, more education, or in case of self-employment. In Italy, however, where its magni-tude is smaller (coherently with the existing literature), the measure seems to be essentially unaffected by temptation, education, and occupation.
The comparison between the two countries shows that, while American and Italians would act similarly in the absence of mandatory programs, under the respective retirement programs the behaviors are instead different. Social Security appears to exert a stronger influence in Italy, where its higher generosity discourages personal savings, and its NDC nature, closely linked with labor income risk, increases the uncertainty in the actual replacement rate.
Future research will be devoted to studying the impact of a reformed Social Security program in the behavior of individuals with different degrees of temptation. Most reform proposals include a DC component, whose benefit depends on the market performance. This might cause a change in the behavior with respect to saving and especially investment, also between the two countries, where my calibration shows that the correlation between income and market risks is not significant in the US but positive and large in Italy. Another interesting issue to investigate with this model is the so-called annuity puzzle.
An individual subject to temptation tends to prefer an annuity to a lump-sum transfer more than one with no temptation, as this is the only way to receive a stable income over retirement.
A. Appendix
A.1. Rule-of-thumb behavior
Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) study in detail the limiting case of an individual with τ → ∞ from an axiomatic perspective. Consider here the system of equations (11) for a rule-of-thumb individual: The reason for this behavior is that such individual always succumbs to temptation; contrary to a hyperbolic discounting individual, she cares about the future as much as the fully disciplined counterpart, and differs only in the ability to exercise discipline.
A.2. The model in detail
Following Carroll (1997) 
The individual chooses the optimal level of consumption, 
It is possible to rewrite the two first-order conditions as follows: 
or, including the liquidity constraints and using a CRRA utility function, 
This system is the counterpart of system (11) 
Both optimal consumption and equity investment depend only on same-period variables so that, with the information available at time t , it is not possible to predict the choice variables at time 1 t + (Hall, 1978) .
Transition from work to retirement
At time t R
= the optimal value function is given by
with an expectation relative to market returns and political risk. From t R = to 1 t R = + the state variables change. When t R ≤ retirement wealth is indeed accumulated into Social Security accounts t db .
They are then converted into annuities a according to the formula The maximization is subject to the motion equations:
and still gives rise to the system of equation (27) . B R is the interest rate of the Social Security account, assumed to be fixed and equal to the average income growth for the US and the real GDP growth in Italy. In the simulation the parameter is assumed to be equal to 2.16% in the US, average income growth on BEA data from 1998 to 2002, and to 2.24% in Italy, average per capita GDP over the same years.
Working life
During the working life the value function is given by
with the expectation in terms of labor income and market returns, and with ( )
scale factor resulting from the standardization by ( )
The individual maximizes (34) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
The system of equations to be solved in order to get optimal consumption and investment choices is 
where an additional factor ( )
appears, as a consequence of the standardization by ( )
A.3. Numerical simulation
Because of the uncertainty on labor income realizations, analytical solutions to this problem do not exist; I therefore use a numerical solution method. The approach is based on the first order conditions, rather than the value function, because the consumption function is smoother than the value function and therefore the numerical approximation to the solution reaches a greater accuracy. With the Italian data, however, information on the annual income variation is not available, since the SHIW survey is carried out every other year. In this case one may consider a two-year average difference: Browning et al. (1985) . This consists of dividing the sample into year-ofbirth cohorts and averaging the relevant variables within each cohort and time period. This way, 533
observations for the US and 392 for Italy are available. After some specification search, the only demographic variable to be significant is the number of components in the household, consistently with Attanasio and Weber (1995) . The variable shows to be more significant in Italy.
The third step consists in estimating, from the same data, an average life-cycle profile for { } 
